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Abstract: Many oppose the use of profile evidence against defendants at trial, even 
when the statistical correlations are reliable and the jury is free from prejudice.  The 
literature has struggled to justify this opposition.  We argue that admitting profile 
evidence is objectionable because it violates what we call “equal protection”—that is, a 
right of innocent defendants not to be exposed to higher ex ante risks of mistaken 
conviction compared to other innocent defendants facing similar charges.  We also show 
why admitting other forms of evidence, such as eyewitness, trace, and motive evidence, 
does not violate equal protection.  !
!
1 INTRODUCTION!
In 1992 a package containing raw opium was delivered to an apartment rented by Neng 
Vue and Lee Vue, two brothers of Hmong ancestry who lived in the city of Minneapolis.  
The police monitored the delivery, and the brothers were arrested and brought to trial on 
opium trafficking charges.  To bolster the case against them, the prosecution called an 
expert witness to the stand who testified that 95 percent of the opium smuggling cases in 
the Minneapolis area involved people of Hmong ancestry.    When paired with the fact 1
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"  U.S. v. Vue, 13 F.3d 1206 (8th Circuit, 1994).1
that the Hmong comprise only 6 percent of the population in the area, the 95 percent 
estimate yields the following correlation:!
Ethnicity: In the Minneapolis area, someone who is of Hmong ancestry is 297 
times more likely to be trafficking drugs as compared to someone who is not of 
Hmong ancestry.  !2
! The brothers were convicted of opium smuggling, and while the correlation 
between ethnicity and drug trafficking would obviously not have been enough on its 
own to convict them, it might well have been the tipping point for the jury.  The 
convictions were reversed on appeal, on the grounds that the jury had been improperly 
invited to “put the Vues’ racial and cultural background into the balance in determining 
their guilt.”    Setting aside the legal details of the court’s argument, there is surely 3
something intuitively troubling about admitting evidence like Ethnicity at trial.   
Allowing such evidence to be used against a defendant would seem to wrong the 
defendant, even when it plays only a supplementary role.  !!
! The use of statistics about ethnicity, especially statistics about a disadvantaged 
and stigmatized ethnicity, may raise special concerns.    But there is also intuitive 4
resistance to admitting the following correlations as evidence against defendants:  !!
Prior Burglary: Someone who has previously been convicted of burglary is 125 
times more likely to commit burglary than someone in the general population.  !5
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"  If the Hmong commit 95% of the opium smuggling crimes and are 6% of population in the area, the 2
remaining 94% of the population must commit only 5% of such crimes. That is, (.95/.06)/(.05/.94)  = 297.
"  U.S. v. Vue, 1213. Many appellate courts have held that evidence like Ethnicity is inadmissible, e.g., U.S. v. 3
Cabrera, 222 F.3d 590 (9th Circuit, 2000).
"  Annabelle Lever usefully distinguishes two approaches to the issue of racial or ethnic profiling: a statistical 4
discrimination approach which treats racial profiling as one instance of a more general issue and a social 
construction approach which is primarily concerned with the specific ways in which racial profiling 
contributes to racial oppression.  We are pursuing the former approach here.  See her “Racial Profiling and 
the Political Philosophy of Race,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Race, ed. Naomi Zack (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2017), 425–435. 
"  See Michael Redmayne, “The Relevance of Bad Character,” Cambridge Law Journal 61 (2002): 684–714.  The 5
U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence 403 forbid, with some exceptions, admitting prior crime evidence.  
Defendants fit the profile in Prior Burglar because of a choice, unlike the profiles in Ethnicity and Bad 
Environment.  On this, see footnote 48.  
Bad Environment: 20% of males brought up in broken homes, addicted to drugs, 
and unemployed go on to commit serious acts of violence, while only 0.1% of 
people in the general population commit such crimes.  !6!
Ethnicity, Prior Burglary, and Bad Environment are all examples of what we shall call 
“profile evidence.”  In its incriminating form, profile evidence expresses a positive, non-
accidental statistical correlation between bearing a certain property and committing a 
type of crime. When the correlation is reliable, and the defendant has the property, this 
evidence is probative of guilt — that is, its addition to the body of evidence would  
increase, sometimes even substantially, the probability that the fact-finders should assign 
to the defendant’s guilt.   !7
! There is a presumption in favor of admitting probative evidence, since normally 
this would make the fact-finders more likely to reach accurate verdicts, and accuracy is 
obviously an important legal value.  Of course evidence that ought to enhance accuracy 
could instead detract from it if fact-finders do not respond appropriately.  They might 
tend to give profile evidence more weight than it deserves, and they might even be 
persuaded by profile evidence to convict defendants for who they are rather than for 
what they did. Nevertheless, while such concerns may underlie some of the resistance to 
the use of profile evidence at trial, they cannot account for all of it.  Even on the 
assumption that fact-finders would respond rationally to Ethnicity, Prior Burglary, and 
Bad Environment, defendants would still seem to have grounds for complaint if such 
evidence were used against them.   !8
! It is not obvious what those grounds could be.  The objection to admitting profile 
evidence cannot be that such evidence is statistical, because admitting other forms of 
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"  For a similar example, see Anthony Duff, “Dangerousness and Citizenship,” in Fundamentals of Sentencing 6
Theory, eds. Andrew Ashworth and Martin Wasik (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 156.
"  For example, Bad Environment evidence can make a significant difference to the probability of the 7
defendant’s guilt. Suppose other evidence singles out two individuals, each initially 50% likely to be guilty, 
where one matches profile BE and the other does not. If someone matching profile BE is 200 times more 
likely to engage in violence than someone in the general population, the 200:1 ratio can be construed to yield  
a guilt probability of 200/(200+1), roughly 99.5%.
"  The possibility of forming a belief based on profile evidence without any epistemic irrationality, in contexts 8
like this one, has recently been challenged on moral encroachment grounds; see, e.g., Rima Basu, “The 
Specter of Normative Conflict: Does Fairness Require Inaccuracy?”in An Introduction to Implicit Bias: 
Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind, eds. Erin Beeghly and Alex Madva (New York: Routledge, 
forthcoming); Renée Jorgensen Bolinger, “The Rational Impermissibility of Accepting (Some) Racial 
Generalizations,” Synthese (forthcoming); and Sarah Moss, Probabilistic Knowledge, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018). For a critical examination of moral encroachment, see Georgi Gardiner,  
“Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment,”in Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on 
Evidentialism, ed. Kevin McCain (Cham: Springer, 2018).  Nothing in our argument will turn on the truth or 
falsehood of moral encroachment. 
statistical evidence is unobjectionable.  If DNA is discovered at a crime scene and it 
matches the defendant’s DNA, it would be appropriate to admit statistics about the low 
frequency of the defendant’s genetic profile within the general population. Nor can the 
objection be that profile evidence cites a generalization about what people like the 
defendant are more likely to do. Motive evidence, such as the fact that the defendant had 
recently fought with the victim, is routinely admitted at trial, even though it implicitly 
invites fact-finders to rely on generalizations like “people who engaged in a heated 
argument with someone are more likely to kill that person as compared to other people.” 
So what is special about profile evidence?!
! Some scholars have argued that the problem with profile evidence is that its 
admissibility at trial may compromise the deterrent effect of punishment.     Other 9
scholars have argued that admitting profile evidence is inconsistent with respecting the 
autonomy or individuality of defendants.    In Section 2, we will explain why these 10
accounts fall short.  The failure of these two approaches, however, should not lead us to 
conclude that the resistance to admitting profile evidence is merely an unwarranted bias, 
as some have urged.    We will argue that resistance to admitting such evidence can be 11
vindicated by appealing to another fundamental legal value, equality before the law.  
This is a familiar legal value, but we believe its implications for evidence law have yet to 
be fully appreciated.  !
! Equality before the law in the context of trial procedure tends to be understood 
as requiring only equal consideration of innocent defendants’ interests in avoiding 
mistaken conviction.    In Section 3, we argue instead for a novel and more demanding 12
interpretation of equality before the law that ascribes to innocent defendants a 
comparative right that we label a right to “equal protection.”    This is a right not to be 13
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"  David Enoch, Talia Fisher, and Levi Spectre, “Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of 9
Knowledge,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 40 (2012):197–224; David Enoch and Talia Fisher, “Sense and 
Sensitivity: Epistemic and Instrumental Approaches to Statistical Evidence,” Stanford Law Review 67 (2015): 
557–611.
"  See David T. Wasserman, “The Morality of Statistical Proof and the Risk of Mistaken Liability,” Cardozo 10
Law Review 13 (1991): 934–976; Amit Pundik, “Freedom and Generalisation," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 37 
(2016): 189–216.
"  See Federico Picinali, “Base-rates of Negative Traits: Instructions for Use in Criminal Trials,” Journal of 11
Applied Philosophy 33 (2016): 69–87; Redmayne, “The Relevance of Bad Character.”
"  See Ronald Dworkin, “Principle, Policy, and Procedure,” in A Matter of Principle (Oxford University Press, 12
1985), 89 and T.M. Scanlon, Why Does Inequality Matter? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 11–25.  
"  What we call the “right to equal protection” does not refer to the 14th Amendment guarantee of equal 13
protection under the law. We take no position here on issues of constitutionality.    
exposed to higher risks of mistaken conviction than other innocent defendants who are 
facing comparably serious charges. !
! We then go on, in Section 4, to show that admitting profile evidence will infringe 
this right to equal protection, because if incriminating profile evidence were admissible 
at trial, innocent defendants who fit an incriminating profile would be exposed to a 
higher risk of mistaken conviction than other innocent defendants.   Admitting 
exculpatory profile evidence, such as evidence that a defendant is less likely to have 
committed a crime because the defendant grew up in, say, a Good Environment, will also 
infringe some defendants’ rights to equal protection, although it will be the rights of 
defendants who do not fit exculpatory profiles rather than the rights of defendants who 
do.  As we will see, however, there is a stronger overall case for overriding defendants’ 
equal protection rights by admitting exculpatory profile evidence than there is for 
overriding those rights by admitting incriminating profile evidence. !
! In Sections 5 and 6, we turn to the implications of equal protection for the 
admissibility of other kinds of evidence.  We will show that the argument we gave 
against the admissibility of profile evidence does not apply to eyewitness, trace, and 
motive evidence since they, unlike profile evidence, can mistakenly incriminate any 
defendant.  Admitting these kinds of evidence might still give rise to unequal risks of 
mistaken incrimination across innocent defendants, in the sense that some categories of 
defendants will be more likely than others to have such evidence introduced against 
them at trial.  But we argue, perhaps surprisingly, that this will not translate into 
unequal risks of mistaken conviction so long as fact-finders assess the probative value of 
the evidence correctly.  A proper assessment of the probative value of profile evidence, 
by contrast, will guarantee unequal risks of mistaken conviction.  Thus, profile evidence 
violates equal protection, not because fact-finders cannot be trusted to evaluate it 
properly, but because of the kind of evidence it is.!!!
2 EXISTING APPROACHES!
Our attempt to vindicate the intuitive resistance to admitting profile evidence, and our 
evaluation of competing approaches, will be guided by two desiderata.  First, since the 
resistance is—we believe—motivated by the thought that admitting profile evidence 
would in some way wrong defendants, at least if they are innocent, we need to identify a 
reason against admitting such evidence that would entail that the defendants would be 
wronged by it.  As we’ll see below, not all reasons against admitting profile evidence 
would satisfy this desideratum.  Secondly, what we seek is an objection to admitting 
profile evidence as such.  There could be objections that are peculiar to particular forms 
of profile evidence.  When the state uses racial or ethnic profiles, as in Ethnicity, this 
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could unavoidably express a false and demeaning message in a society where 
stereotypes that attribute innate criminality to these groups are prevalent.   After 14
someone who was convicted of a crime has paid their debt to society, it may be unjust to 
use their prior crime against them, as in Prior Burglary.    But there is also resistance to 15
profile evidence whatever its form.  It is this broader resistance that we aim to 
vindicate.   !16!
2.1 Earlier we mentioned two approaches that might be capable of identifying an 
objection to admitting profile evidence as such.  One approach appeals to the legal value 
of deterrence, and shows how the admissibility of profile evidence could reduce the 
deterrence effect of punishment.  Consider an agent deliberating about whether to 
commit a crime.  What is distinctive about profile evidence is that, if the agent belongs to 
a profiled category, the corresponding profile evidence will be available against the 
agent whether or not they commit the crime.  Thus, for people who fit profiles, the 
admissibility of profile evidence could reduce their incentive to abstain from the crime, 
because it would make their chances of being punished less dependent on whether or 
not they choose to commit the crime.      !17
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"  See Deborah Hellman, “Racial Profiling and the Meaning of Racial Categories,” in Contemporary Debates in 14
Applied Ethics (2nd edition), ed. Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher H. Wellman (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2014), 232-244. On the significance of the fact that when certain social groups are profiled, each 
instance of profiling can be expected to contribute to a larger pattern of similar actions, see Bolinger, “The 
Rational Impermissibility;” Adam Homar Hosein, “Racial Profiling and a Reasonable Sense of Inferior 
Political Status,” Journal of Political Philosophy 26 (2018): 1–20 (2018); and Andreas Mogensen, “Racial 
Profiling and Cumulative Injustice,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2019): 452–477.  For a 
general discussion of how implicit racial biases generate legal and political injustices, see Michael Cholbi 
and Alex Madva, “Black Lives Matter and the Call for Death Penalty Abolition,” Ethics 128 (2018): 517–544. 
"  Anthony Duff and Sandra Marshall,  “Character and Propensities: Some (Mis)uses of Statistics in Criminal 15
Trials,” Unpublished Manuscript, 9-11.  
"  Our examples may seem to trade on the fact that defendants fitting those profiles already tend to suffer 16
from discrimination, but the following example arouses the same intuitive resistance, even though the 
profile does not pick out a socially salient category of defendants: !!
Warrior Gene:  Someone who carries the low activity allele of the MAOA gene is twice as likely to 
engage in violent, aggressive and antisocial behavior than someone who carries the high activity 
allele of the MAOA gene. !!
See Sally McSwiggan, Bernice Elger and Paul S. Appelbaum, “The Forensic Use of Behavioral Genetics in 
Criminal Proceedings: Case of the MAOA-L Genotype,” International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 50 (2017): 
17–23)
"  See Enoch et al., “Statistical Evidence” and Enoch and Fisher, “Sense and Sensitivity.” On the limits of the 17
deterrence approach, see Georgi Gardiner, “Legal Burdens of Proof and Statistical Evidence,” in The 
Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology, eds. David Coady and James Chase (New York: Routledge, 2018). 
! Although deterrence is obviously a legally relevant value, there are two reasons 
to doubt that this approach can vindicate the resistance to the admissibility of profile 
evidence. First, as the proponents of the deterrence approach themselves note, it is only 
when statistical evidence would be enough or nearly enough on its own for a conviction 
that its admissibility could compromise the deterrence effect of punishment. Even 
though evidence like Ethnicity, Prior Burglary, and Bad Environment can have 
considerable probative value, such evidence is not enough or nearly enough on its own 
to convict someone of a crime.  Thus, even if it were admissible at trial, people belonging 
to these profiles would still have a strong incentive to abstain from crime, since whether 
there would be enough evidence overall to convict them would still depend heavily on 
whether they commit the crime or not.    !18
! The second issue with the deterrence approach is that it does not even attempt to 
explain how admitting profile evidence could wrong defendants.  Even if admitting 
profile evidence against defendants would compromise deterrence, these defendants 
would have no special standing to complain.  The state may have a duty to preserve the 
deterrence value of punishment, but this is owed to the general public, not to defendants 
in particular.!!
2.2  There is another approach to profile evidence that, unlike the deterrence approach, 
does attempt to explain how its admission would wrong defendants.  According to this 
other approach, admitting profile evidence is inconsistent with the legal commitment to 
respect the autonomy or individuality of defendants.     The literature has largely been 19
dismissive of this approach, on the grounds that there is no incompatibility between 
relying on profile evidence to infer what a defendant has done and viewing the 
defendant as having done it autonomously.    But there is another way of understanding 20
this approach that cannot be so easily dismissed, namely, that in relying on profile 
evidence, the fact-finders treat the defendant merely as a member of a group and not as 
an individual. !
! If profile evidence is admitted at trial, the fact-finders may reach a decision to 
convict based in part on a generalization about the group the defendant belongs to.  
Even if they do not ultimately convict, profile evidence still invites them to infer, on the 
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"  Enoch and Fisher in “Sense and Sensitivity” also note that the admissibility of prior act evidence like Prior 18
Burglary will not dampen incentives to avoid crime if we take into account the period before the first crime is 
committed. 
"  Wasserman, “The Morality of Statistical Proof” and Pundik, “Freedom and Generalisation.”19
"  For criticisms, see Picinali, “Base-rates," 73–75, and Mike Redmayne, “Exploring the Proof Paradoxes,” 20
Legal Theory 14 (2008): 292-296.
basis of the defendant’s group membership, that the defendant is more likely to have a 
propensity to commit a type of crime, or at least a stronger propensity than others who 
do not belong to the defendant’s group.  Since these inferences are based on 
generalizations, they could treat the defendant merely as a member of a group and not 
as an individual.  ! ! !
! But treating someone as an individual does not, on the most plausible 
interpretation, require eschewing reliance on (accurate) generalizations.  Rather, it only 
requires being receptive to the possibility that the individual is an exception to the 
generalization—that is, being receptive to any finer-grained information that would 
indicate the generalization is not to be relied upon in drawing a conclusion about the 
individual.    A job applicant who was rejected because of a criminal history could 21
complain of not being treated as an individual if the employer had ignored information 
about the applicant’s long record of trustworthiness since the crime or had denied the 
applicant an opportunity to present this information.  But a defendant in a trial is given 
an opportunity to introduce evidence that distinguishes them from their group and is 
entitled to have this information taken into consideration by the fact-finders.  In a well-
functioning courtroom, then, fact-finders could use profile evidence without failing to 
treat the defendant as an individual.  !22!!
3 EQUAL PROTECTION !
Neither the deterrence approach nor the autonomy approach seems able to fully capture 
our resistance to the admissibility of profile evidence.  We now turn to our own 
proposal.  We will present an argument for what we call a “right to equal protection” — 
that is, a comparative right belonging to innocent defendants not to be exposed to higher 
risks of mistaken conviction than other innocent defendants facing comparably serious 
charges.  Our strategy will be to first describe a non-comparative right not to be exposed 
to an excessive risk of mistaken conviction, which we call a “right to due protection.”  
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"  We think this is the most plausible way of understanding Wasserman’s objection in “The Morality of 21
Statistical Proof.”  For accounts of what it is to treat someone as an individual, see Kasper Lippert-
Rasmussen, “We Are All Different: Statistical Discrimination and the Right to Be Treated as an Individual,” 
Journal of Ethics 15 (2011): 47–59 and Benjamin Eidelson, “Treating People as Individuals,” in Philosophical 
Foundations of Discrimination Law, ed. Deborah Hellman and Sophie Moreau (Oxford: Oxford University 
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"  When the defendant identifies with their group, as they might in the case of Ethnicity, they may be 22
understandably reluctant to attempt to distinguish themselves from their group, even when they could.  To 
avoid forcing defendants to choose between distancing themselves from a group they identify with and 
defending themselves as effectively as possible, perhaps Ethnicity and other forms of profile evidence where 
defendants are likely to identify with their group should not be admissible.  But this reasoning would not 
extend to other examples of profile evidence like Bad Environment and Prior Burglary.  
Then we will identify an intuitive, fairness-based complaint that cannot be explained by 
this non-comparative right and that can only be explained by ascribing to innocent 
defendants a comparative right to equal protection.  Equal protection, then, is our 
interpretation of what equality before the law demands in the context of criminal trials. 
As we will see in the next section, it is this comparative right to equal protection that 
would be infringed by rules of evidence that allow profile evidence to be introduced at 
trial.  !
! !
3.1 Criminal trials aim at accurate verdicts, that is, at convicting the guilty and only the 
guilty.  Trials are fallible, however, and inevitably some defendants will be mistakenly 
convicted of a crime they did not commit.  This does not mean that the trial system 
cannot be justified to innocent defendants.  While innocent defendants cannot demand 
not to be exposed to any risk of mistaken conviction at all, they do have certain rights 
against these risks.    We will understand the risks of mistaken conviction from the ex 23
ante perspective of lawmakers who design the trial system (more on this later).  From 
this perspective, the risks of mistaken conviction are a function of the procedural 
protections that are provided to defendants, such as the standard of proof, the voting 
rule for juries, and the rules of evidence.    !24
! Innocent defendants clearly have a right against being exposed to an excessive or 
undue risk of mistaken conviction, but what counts as an excessive risk?  Unless we are 
prepared to reduce the risk to zero by abolishing prosecution, we must concede that a 
risk greater than zero is not excessive if it would be too costly to reduce it further.  To 
decide whether a risk-reducing protection is too costly, we need to balance its costs—
which can be direct, such as the costs of providing legal representation to indigent 
defendants, or indirect, such as the costs of increased crime—against the importance of 
avoiding mistaken convictions.    We accept the standard view that, on any given charge, 25
avoiding mistaken convictions is not only very important but also relatively more 
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"  The risk of mistaken conviction for innocent defendants is the conditional probability Pr(C/I) that if a 23
defendant is factually innocent (abbreviated I), the defendant is convicted (abbreviated C).
"  For the view that procedural rights are derivative substantive rights against risks, see Larry Alexander, 24
“Are Procedural Rights Derivative Substantive Rights?” Law and Philosophy 17 (1998): 19–42. 
"  Many procedures that reduce the risk of mistaken convictions also increase the risk of mistaken acquittals.  25
Retributivist theories would conceive of the indirect costs associated with mistaken acquittals differently, for 
example, as guilty defendants failing to receive the censure they deserve.  
important than avoiding mistaken acquittals.    Innocent defendants, then, have a right 26
against being exposed to a level of risk whose further reduction would be cost-justified, 
in light of the special importance of avoiding mistaken convictions. We call this the 
“right to due protection.” !
! Since both of the factors that must be balanced in determining due protection — 
that is, the importance of avoiding mistaken convictions and the costs of protection — 
can vary across categories of defendants, the right to due protection is compatible with 
two types of inequalities in the risks of mistaken conviction. First, it might be more 
important to avoid mistaken convictions for some defendants than others, depending on 
the gravity of the charges against them.  For example, avoiding mistaken convictions for 
murder may be more important than avoiding mistaken convictions for petty theft, since 
the condemnation and punishment associated with murder convictions are much worse. 
Insofar as due protection is sensitive to the importance of avoiding mistaken 
convictions, what would count as an excessive risk of mistaken conviction for 
defendants facing murder charges might not count as an excessive risk for defendants 
facing charges of petty theft.  Due protection would therefore permit the latter 
defendants to be exposed to a higher risk of mistaken conviction than the former.     !27
! Secondly, among defendants charged with comparably serious crimes, there can 
be predictable differences in the costs, whether direct or indirect, of achieving a given 
level of protection.  In terms of direct costs, it may be more expensive to protect poor 
defendants who do not speak English than poor defendants who do speak English, 
because they may need to be provided with a translator as well as a public defender in 
order to enjoy a similar level of protection.    In terms of indirect costs, since some 28
groups of defendants have higher recidivism rates than others, mistaken acquittals of 
defendants from such groups could lead to more crime than mistaken acquittals of 
defendants who do not belong to any of these groups.   Since due protection is sensitive 
to costs, it would allow defendants whose protection is more costly to be exposed to 
higher risks of mistaken conviction than defendants whose protection is less costly, even 
when they are facing the same charges.  !!
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Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
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"  See the amicus brief by the ACLU in the case Annie Ling v. Georgia, case n. S10-C0460 (2010).28
3.2 In order to determine whether defendants have, in addition to the right to due 
protection, a comparative right against risks, we need to consider whether either of the 
two inequalities described above is objectionable.  We do not think an inequality in risks 
of mistaken conviction that merely reflects differences in the importance of avoiding 
mistaken convictions would be unfair to the defendants charged with minor crimes.  If 
trial procedures were to be adjusted by setting the standard of proof lower for, say, 
minor than for major charges, those accused of minor crimes would be subject to higher 
risks compared to those accused of major crimes, but they would not necessarily be 
disadvantaged since a mistaken conviction may also be less bad for them.    !29
! By contrast, inequalities that reflect differences in the costs of protection do strike 
us as objectionable.  To make this apparent, we will focus on the example about variation 
in indirect costs of protection due to defendants’ different recidivism rates.  There are a 
number of factors associated with higher recidivism, such as age, gender, neighborhood, 
employment, and level of education.  Mistaken acquittals of guilty defendants without a 
college education, for example, would lead to more crime than mistaken acquittals of 
guilty college-educated defendants.    Since the cost of mistakenly acquitting defendants 30
without a college education is then predictably greater than mistakenly acquitting 
defendants with a college education, due protection would, in principle, permit a lower 
standard of proof for defendants without a college education than for college-educated 
defendants, even when they are charged with comparably serious crimes.    The lower 31
standard of proof would genuinely disadvantage innocent defendants without a college 
education, and intuitively, they would have grounds for complaint.  Exposing one 
category of innocent defendants to higher risks of mistaken conviction than others 
simply because they are more costly to protect seems unfair. !
! We should make clear that this intuition is about their exposure to higher risks, 
and not just a reflection of a prior belief that the standard of proof should for some other 
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reason be fixed.    Even if the standard of proof were fixed across defendants while the 32
risks of mistaken conviction were adjusted in other ways, such as by assigning six jurors 
to defendants without a college education and twelve jurors to college-educated 
defendants or by varying the jury voting rule from majority to unanimity, defendants 
without a college education could still voice the same complaint.   Since the complaint of 33
defendants without a college education would seem to depend essentially on the fact 
that college-educated defendants facing the same charges were treated more favorably, 
the explanation we favor is that innocent defendants possess a certain comparative right 
against risks. Specifically, we maintain that equality before the law, or comparative 
fairness, demands what we have labeled “equal protection”: that innocent defendants 
not be exposed to higher risks of mistaken conviction than other innocent defendants 
facing the same charges or comparably serious charges.!
! This right to equal protection, as we have defined it, differs in an important way 
from another comparative right that is often cited in connection with criminal procedure, 
namely, a right to equal consideration.  This other right is infringed when a distribution 
of risks cannot be defended except on the prohibited assumption that some defendants' 
interests in avoiding mistaken conviction are less worthy of consideration than other 
defendants’ comparable interests.   We agree that defendants possess a comparative 34
right to equal consideration in this sense, but this right cannot explain the complaint of 
the defendants without a college education.  The choice to impose higher risks of 
mistaken conviction on defendants without a college education need not reflect a view 
that their interests in avoiding mistaken convictions are less worthy of concern than the 
interests of college-educated defendants facing similarly serious charges, but only a 
difference in the costs of providing the same level of protection.  Thus, in order to 
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"  Some argue that fact-finders should deliver a guilty verdict only if they fully believe or know that the 32
defendant is guilty, no matter the gravity of the charge, and that a variable standard of proof would conflict 
with this requirement; see Antony Duff, Lindsay Farmer, Sandra Marshall and Victor Tadros, The Trial on 
Trial: Volume 3 (London: Hart Publishing, 2007), 89–90.  Even if Duff et al. are correct about this, this concern 
would not extend to altering the number of jurors or the voting rule, since these measures are consistent 
with every fact-finder voting guilty only if they fully believe in the defendant’s guilt.  
"  Their complaint cannot be about the mere fact that they are being tried under different procedures either.  33
For suppose lawmakers knew that six jurors operating under a unanimity voting rule were just as likely, in 
relation to any given body of evidence, to return a guilty verdict as twelve jurors operating under a majority 
voting rule. If these different procedures delivered exactly the same degree of protection and there was no 
insulting motivation behind the choice of different procedures, defendants tried under these different 
procedures could have no objection.  
"  For versions of what we’re labeling a comparative right to “equal consideration,” see Ronald Dworkin, 34
“Principle, Policy, and Procedure,” 89, and T.M. Scanlon, Why Does Inequality Matter?, 11–25.  Due protection 
and equal consideration are distinct.  If some groups are given more protection than is worth the costs, while 
others are given exactly the level of protection that is worth the costs, this would violate equal consideration 
but not due protection.
explain why defendants without a college education would have the complaint they do, 
we need to appeal to a comparative right to equal protection.  !35!
3.3 Equal protection is our interpretation of what equality before the law, or comparative 
fairness, demands in the context of the criminal trial. In the next section, we will explain 
why the admissibility of profile evidence would infringe the right to equal protection.  
Before we turn to that discussion, a few final clarifications are in order. !
! First, the conception of risk that is deployed in the content of the right to equal 
protection is neither purely subjective nor purely objective, but rather epistemic in the 
sense that it should be assessed from the evidence-relative perspective of a reasonable 
person. As others have argued, an epistemic conception of risk is the most suitable 
conception for the morality of risk imposition in general.    And in our view, such a 36
conception is also especially apt for interpreting equal protection, since equality before 
the law demands impartiality, and only securing equal epistemic risks of mistaken 
conviction would adequately express the state’s commitment to impartiality.  !37
! Second, since the right to equal protection is supposed to guide the design of 
criminal procedure and evidence law, the risks of mistaken conviction should be 
assessed in light of the information available to reasonable lawmakers, such as 
legislators and appellate court judges who set legal precedent.  This information will 
inevitably be limited.   As they design criminal procedure and evidence law, lawmakers 
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"  Since some defendants lacking a college education will also possess characteristics that are known to 35
reduce the risk of recidivism, such as being older or being female, they might complain that lawmakers have 
failed to treat them as individuals.  But suppose that all the characteristics of each defendant were entered 
into the best available algorithm to predict the chances of recidivism if guilty, and on that basis each 
defendant was assigned either six or twelve jurors.  It would still be the case that defendants without a 
college education would be at higher risk of mistaken conviction than college-educated defendants, since 
they would be at higher risk of being assigned six jurors by the algorithm.  And they would still, in our 
view, have a complaint against these higher risks, even though they could not say the system failed to treat 
them as individuals, since by hypothesis the algorithm did not neglect any of the available finer-grained 
evidence bearing on their risk of recidivism. 
"  See John Oberdiek, Imposing Risk: A Normative Framework (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). This 36
epistemic or “evidence-relative” conception of risk is neither fact-relative (purely objective), which would 
require lawmakers to act on whatever the correct beliefs about the objective probabilities would be, nor 
belief-relative (purely subjective), which would only require lawmakers to act on whatever degrees of belief 
they happened to have. 
"  If the epistemic risks from the perspective of lawmakers were unequal, they could not claim to be 37
impartial even though, unbeknownst to them, the objective risks were equal.  The same is true if the 
epistemic risks were unequal, yet the subjective risks were equal only because the lawmakers had buried 
their heads in the sand.  The lawmakers could, however, claim to be impartial if the epistemic risks were 
equal even though the trial process was deterministic and every defendant was either objectively certain to 
be convicted or acquitted.  See David Wasserman, “Let Them Eat Chances: Probability and Distributive 
Justice,” Economics and Philosophy 12 (1996): 29–49, for an argument along similar lines that the fairness of 
lotteries depends on the way they distribute epistemic rather than objective chances.   
cannot predict the identities of future defendants in criminal trials or the circumstances 
of particular future crimes.  What they can know, from their ex ante point of view, are the 
following: that some of the defendants will be or could be innocent; what types of 
defendants there are or might be (so long as those types are specifiable without reference 
to the circumstances of particular crimes);   what kinds of evidence there could be; and 38
other general facts, such as what prosecutors and defense attorneys are likely to do in 
response to the rules of evidence and how fact-finders would respond to bodies of 
evidence.  For equal protection to guide lawmakers’ decisions about the rules of trial 
procedure, then, the risks to innocent defendants must be assessed from lawmakers’ 
incompletely informed ex ante perspective.     !39
! The third clarification is that equal protection, as we have defined it, is a right 
that innocent people possess as defendants. It could be in the interests of some 
categories of innocent citizens that they be exposed to higher risks of mistaken 
conviction, should they ever become defendants.  For example, setting a lower standard 
of proof for defendants without a college education would expose innocent defendants 
in that category to a higher risk of mistaken conviction, but it would also lower the risk 
that guilty defendants without a college education would get away with their crimes.  If 
the main victims of guilty people without a college education were innocent people 
without a college education, this could work out to the net benefit of innocent people 
without a college education. Perhaps higher risks of mistaken conviction could be 
justified in this way to innocent citizens without a college education, who might become 
but are not currently defendants.  But the criminal trial is a distinct stage in the criminal 
justice process, and equality before the law asserts itself at each stage.    This means that 40
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"  Knowing that there are or could be defendants belonging to a certain ethnicity, having a certain socio-38
economic status or criminal record is possible without knowing the details of any particular crime or the 
identities of any particular defendant.
"  Even when the risks are equal from the ex ante point of view of lawmakers, there will inevitably be 39
downstream inequalities in outcomes: some innocent defendants will be convicted and other innocent (and 
guilty) defendants will be acquitted.  There will also inevitably be more incriminating evidence against some 
innocent defendants than others.  But notice that there is no way for lawmakers (or anyone else) to redress 
these downstream inequalities without knowing the identities of the innocents, short of abandoning 
prosecution entirely.  By contrast, it is possible to redress inequalities in the ex ante risks of mistaken 
conviction across categories of innocent defendants by adjusting criminal trial procedure.  It is enough to 
know that there are or could be innocent defendants in each category. Since the procedures apply to 
everyone, lawmakers can know whether there is an inequality in the ex ante risk of mistaken conviction and 
how to correct it without knowing who the innocent defendants are.  
"  Ex ante contractualists may need to require justifiability to a person at each time to avoid endorsing multi-40
stage schemes that are in everyone’s ex ante interest in the first stage but severely burden a few in the second 
stage, e.g., a lottery that selects 10 patients from 100 on which to perform deadly experiments in order to 
save the other 90.  See Johann Frick’s ‘Decomposition Test,’ defended in “Contractualism and Social Risk,” 
Philosophy & Public Affairs, 43 (2015): 201–212.  We think the same point has application to the stages of the 
criminal justice system. 
the higher risks of mistaken conviction must also be justified to those citizens who have 
now become innocent defendants, and this cannot be done, because while those higher 
risks may have been in their interests as citizens, they are no longer in their interests as 
defendants.   Thus, unequal risks of mistaken conviction, whether brought about by a 41
lower standard of proof, fewer jurors, or as we will see in the next section, the 
admissibility of profile evidence, remain unfair to those innocent defendants who are at 
a higher risk, even if these measures were in their interests as assessed from an earlier 
stage in the criminal justice process.  !
! Finally, it is only innocent defendants who possess the right to equal protection, 
as we have defined it.  Guilty defendants, whoever they are, are at no risk of mistaken 
conviction, so they are not covered by equal protection.   Of course, since lawmakers do 
not know who is innocent and who is guilty, they cannot respect the rights of innocent 
defendants without extending the same protections to all defendants, innocent and 
guilty.  But are guilty defendants also entitled to something analogous to equal 
protection? Since guilty defendants have no grounds for complaint if the trial system 
exposes them to a higher risk of conviction than innocent defendants, as any reliable 
trial system would, equality before the law cannot require that everyone, guilty and 
innocent alike, be exposed to equal risks of conviction.  But perhaps guilty defendants 
have a right not to be exposed to higher risks of correct conviction than other guilty 
defendants facing comparable charges.  We have less confidence that guilty defendants 
possess a right to equal chances of avoiding conviction for a crime they did commit than 
that innocent defendants have a right to equal protection, and we also have less 
confidence that guilty defendants would be wronged by the use of profile evidence.   42
This is why we concentrate on innocent defendants. However, the objection to profile 
evidence on behalf of innocent defendants that we develop below could easily be 
extended to guilty defendants by ascribing them a right to equal risks of correct 
conviction. !!
 !!
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"  A consideration that might, by contrast, be capable of justifying a higher risk of mistaken conviction to a 41
group of defendants qua defendants would be that exposing them to a higher risk (comparatively speaking) 
is necessary to lower their absolute risk of mistaken conviction.  But such a defense is not available for 
admitting profile evidence at trial.
"  This is not because we doubt that guilty defendants could have any procedural rights at all.  But see 42
Christopher H. Wellman, Rights, Forfeiture, and Punishment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 91–119 
for the view that guilty defendants have no procedural rights, and see David Enoch, “In Defense of 
Procedural Rights (Or Anyway, Procedural Duties): A Response to Wellman,” Legal Theory 24 (2018): 40–49, 
for a rejoinder. 
4 AGAINST ADMITTING PROFILE EVIDENCE!
Having defended the right to equal protection, we will now explain why admitting 
profile evidence would conflict with it.  Since it is legislators and appellate courts setting 
precedents that decide evidence law, our objection is addressed to these lawmakers. We 
will begin by offering an argument against admitting incriminating profile evidence and 
then turn to exculpatory profile evidence.!!
4.1 As a starting point, imagine a trial system whose rules forbade profile evidence from 
being admitted during trial proceedings. If the system were changed so that profile 
evidence became admissible, what would be the consequences for defendants? By 
making incriminating profile evidence admissible, the trial system would allow 
prosecutors to present an additional form of evidence that was probative of guilt. For 
example, it would allow prosecutors to present the profile evidence in Bad Environment 
that expresses a positive correlation between fitting profile BE—that is, being male, 
addicted to drugs, unemployed and having grown up in a broken home—and 
committing a violent crime. Presenting this evidence at trial would increase, sometimes 
significantly, the probability of guilt of defendants who fit profile BE.  !43
! Assuming that prosecutors would take advantage of opportunities to present 
evidence of guilt, making profile evidence admissible would mean that Bad Environment 
evidence would now be presented against defendants who match the relevant profile 
and have been charged with a violent crime.   By contrast, the chances that prosecutors 44
would present the same profile evidence against defendants who are charged with the 
same crime but who do not fit profile BE would be zero, since this profile evidence could 
not be probative of these defendants’ guilt.! !
! The difference just identified between defendants who fit profile BE and 
defendants who do not fit this profile can be known ex ante, in advance of any particular 
trial or criminal investigation. Without knowing the circumstances of any particular 
violent crimes, lawmakers can still know that if an individual who matches profile BE 
were to become a defendant charged with a violent crime, this defendant would be at a 
higher risk of incrimination by Bad Environment profile evidence than would a defendant 
who does not match profile BE.  This difference in the risk of incrimination would apply 
broadly to all defendants, and thus also to innocent defendants. Making profile evidence 
such as Bad Environment admissible across trials would therefore increase the ex ante risk 
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"  See footnote 7.43
"  If the evidence is admissible, the probability that the prosecutor presents the evidence at trial is a function 44
of three probabilities: (i) the probability that the evidence exists; (ii) the probability that if it exists, it is 
discovered; and (iii) the probability that if it is discovered, the prosecutor presents it at trial. 
that an additional kind of incriminating evidence would be presented against innocent 
defendants, but only against the innocents who fit profiles such as BE.! ! !
! Now suppose that fact-finders’ decisions to convict are rationally calibrated with 
the probative value of the overall body of evidence presented at trial. When the fact-
finders are rationally calibrated with the body of evidence, the more probative of guilt 
the body of evidence is, the more likely the defendant will be convicted, while the less 
strongly probative of guilt the body of evidence is, the less likely the defendant will be 
convicted. This has important consequences for the distribution of the ex ante risks of 
mistaken conviction. Since admitting evidence that shows a positive correlation between 
fitting profile BE and committing a violent crime would make the overall body of 
evidence more probative of guilt, this admission should, by calibration, increase the risk 
of mistaken conviction for the innocents who fit profile BE.  However, it would not 
increase the risk of mistaken conviction for innocents who do not fit this profile. And the 
more Bad Environment evidence adds to the probative value of the overall body of 
evidence, the more its admission should, again by calibration, increase the risk of 
mistaken conviction for the innocent defendants who fit profile BE.!
! This conclusion does not only apply to defendants who fit profile BE, but it 
applies as well to any defendant who fits a profile that is positively correlated with 
committing a violent crime. Any such defendant would be subject to an increased risk of 
mistaken conviction for violent crimes.  But, crucially, this increased risk would also be 
limited to those defendants.  Innocent defendants charged with violent crimes who were 
fortunate enough to not fit any profile that was positively correlated with committing a 
violent crime would be immune to incrimination by profile evidence.!
! The same argument we gave for profiles correlated with violent crimes can also 
be applied to profiles correlated with other types of crimes, such as Ethnicity and drug 
smuggling, Prior Burglary and burglary, and so on. The profiles in question may pick out 
features that structure interactions across a wide range of social contexts, such as 
ethnicity, gender, age, and class.  But they might also pick out features that are not 
socially salient at all, such as genetic characteristics.   All that is required for the 45
argument to apply is that it be possible for lawmakers to distinguish, in advance of 
particular trials, between those who fall under a profile positively correlated with a type 
of crime and those who do not. !!
4.2  We can now see why admitting incriminating profile evidence at trial would conflict 
with defendants’ right to equal protection.  We have seen that the admission of profile 
evidence would increase the ex ante risk of mistaken conviction for all and only innocent 
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"  See, e.g., Warrior Gene in footnote 16.45
defendants who match a relevant incriminating profile. This increase in risk would, in 
turn, expose them to a higher risk of mistaken conviction than other innocent 
defendants, other things equal.   The profiled defendants burdened by a higher risk of 46
mistaken conviction, then, would have an equal protection-based complaint against a 
trial system that admitted incriminating profile evidence.   This is our objection to 47
admitting incriminating profile evidence at trial.   	48
! The complaint against admitting incriminating profile evidence cannot be 
justified by appealing to either of the other rights we discussed in Section 3.  It cannot be 
justified by invoking the non-comparative right to due protection because there is no 
reason to think that admitting incriminating profile evidence would expose innocent 
defendants to an excessive risk of mistaken conviction. Nor can the complaint be 
justified by invoking the comparative right to equal consideration.  Equal consideration, 
unlike equal protection, is compatible with unequal risks when these different risks 
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"  If innocent defendants who fit a certain profile antecedently enjoy a lower risk of mistaken conviction, the 46
increase in risk brought about by admitting profile evidence might reduce, not create, an inequality. But 
there is no reason to think that admitting profile evidence would systematically redress imbalances in the 
prior distribution of risks. In fact, since many forms of profile evidence target categories of defendants who 
may already be at a disadvantage, in terms of access to quality legal representation, admitting profile 
evidence would if anything tend to exacerbate antecedent inequalities in the risks of mistaken conviction 
rather than reduce them.
"  The right to equal protection is a right not to be exposed to a higher risk of mistaken conviction than other 47
innocent defendants on trial for comparably serious crimes — that is, on trial for the same crime or a 
different but comparably serious crime.  Note that it is possible for a type of defendant to be at a higher risk 
for the same or a comparably serious crime without being at a higher risk in relation to a class of 
comparably serious crimes.  Suppose that A's are more likely to commit car theft and B's are more likely to 
commit motorcycle theft.  If profile evidence is admissible, neither A's nor B's will be at higher risk of 
mistaken conviction in relation to the class of comparably serious crimes consisting of car theft and 
motorcycle theft.  But A's on trial for car theft would have an equal protection complaint, since A's would be 
at higher risk of mistaken conviction for car theft than B's, and B's on trial for motorcycle theft would have 
an equal protection complaint, since B's would be at higher risk of mistaken conviction for motorcycle theft 
than A's.  We thank one of the associate editors of this journal for the example. 
"  Our objection applies to all profile evidence, even when the profile is a matter of choice.  This might be 48
challenged. An associate editor suggested that the right to equal protection should be responsibility-
sensitive, in the sense that exposing a class of defendants to higher risks of mistaken conviction would be 
acceptable so long as these defendants had a fair opportunity to avoid those higher risks.  The rules of 
evidence could then admit profile evidence involving profiles that defendants would match only because of 
earlier choices they had made.  We do not have an argument against choice-sensitivity in the context of trial 
procedure, but we think that recognizing innocent defendants' equal status requires abstracting away from 
most and perhaps all differences due to choices.  Even if all innocent defendants who fit crime-correlated 
descriptions like “lacks a college education,” “is unemployed,” or “is unmarried,” had what could be 
considered a fair opportunity to avoid falling under those descriptions, this would not license exposing 
these defendants to a higher risk of mistaken conviction than innocent defendants who had made different 
choices in life.  Even defendants’ earlier illegal choices, as in Prior Burglary, would not warrant exposure to 
higher risks after they have paid their debt to society.  We concede, however, that choice-sensitivity may 
have more plausibility in relation to certain choices, such as a choice to associate with members of a criminal 
organization. For an example of a principle of fairness that is, unlike our principle of equal protection, 
thoroughly responsibility-sensitive, see Mogensen, “Racial Profiling.”   
reflect differences in the costs of protection.  Since equalizing these risks by excluding 
profile evidence would come at a cost in terms of mistaken acquittals of the profiled 
defendants, a choice to leave the inequality intact need not imply that the interests of the 
disadvantaged defendants in avoiding mistaken convictions have been given less 
weight.  !49!
4.3 So far we have only discussed profile evidence in its incriminating form, but profile 
evidence can also take an exculpatory form.  For example, a defendant who attended 
college might seek to present as exculpatory evidence the fact that attending college is 
negatively correlated with committing the type of crime they have been accused of.   
Should profile evidence in its exculpatory form be inadmissible as well? The law does 
look more favorably on admitting at least certain kinds of exculpatory profile evidence, 
such as good character evidence.    And we suspect there may be less intuitive resistance 50
to admitting profile evidence that would exculpate rather than incriminate defendants.  
After all, since the admissibility of exculpatory profile evidence could only help innocent 
defendants, not hurt them, who could object?   As we will explain below, however, there 
are defendants who could have legitimate objections to the admissibility of exculpatory 
profile evidence.!
! Notice first that, even if incriminating profile evidence were inadmissible, the 
admissibility of exculpatory profile evidence could still increase the risk of mistaken 
conviction for defendants who fit incriminating profiles in the following way.  If 
exculpatory profile evidence were admissible, fact-finders might infer from the fact that 
it was not presented by the defense that the defendant must fall under an incriminating 
profile.  For example, if it were customary for the defense to announce that a defendant 
had no criminal record whenever a defendant had no criminal record, fact-finders could 
infer from the absence of such an announcement in a particular case that the defendant 
in this case must have a criminal record.    Thus, admitting exculpatory profile evidence 51
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"  As a referee has pointed out, if lawmakers knew that there would be only one trial and knew the identity 49
of the only defendant, then a decision to admit profile evidence against that defendant would not be 
vulnerable to our objection.  If using profile evidence against that defendant still seems objectionable, our 
account cannot capture that objection.  But if there were a second trial, and the lawmakers decided to admit 
profile evidence, knowing that it could only be used against the first and not the second defendant, the first 
defendant would surely have a stronger complaint, and our account can capture that.  
"  See, e.g., Federal Rules of Evidence 404(a)(1).50
"  An anonymous reviewer made this point. For further discussion, see Larry Laudan and Ronald J. Allen, 51
“The Devastating Impact of Prior Crimes Evidence and Other Myths of the Criminal Justice Process,” The 
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 101 (2013): 493–528.
could have the same effect on defendants who fit incriminating profiles that admitting 
incriminating profile evidence would. !
! But suppose that we could prevent this effect by instructing fact-finders not to 
draw any adverse inferences from the fact that no exculpatory profile evidence was 
presented on behalf of a defendant, just as they are instructed not to draw adverse 
inferences from the fact that a defendant chose not to testify.  If these instructions were 
effective, then admitting exculpatory profile evidence would not increase the risk of 
mistaken conviction for defendants who fit incriminating profiles, and it would only 
reduce the risk for defendants who fit exculpatory profiles.  Who, then, could be 
wronged?   Obviously defendants who fit exculpatory profiles, such as defendants who 
have graduated from college, would have no complaint.  But if we take up the 
perspective of defendants who are just as innocent, but cannot avail themselves of this 
exculpatory evidence because they are not college graduates, we can begin to see how 
the admissibility of exculpatory evidence could be unfair to them.  Our account can 
capture their complaint, since the right to equal protection is a right not to be exposed to 
a higher risk of mistaken conviction than other innocent defendants, and innocent 
defendants can be exposed to a higher risk either because their risk was increased or 
because the risk to other defendants was lowered.!
! Still, incriminating and exculpatory profile evidence are not entirely on a par.  !
Banning incriminating profile evidence would realize equal protection by enhancing or 
``leveling up’’ the level of protection (i.e., reducing the level of risk) for some, namely 
defendants who match incriminating profiles. By contrast, banning exculpatory profile 
evidence would realize equal protection by reducing or “leveling down” the level of 
protection (i.e., increasing the level of risk) for some, namely defendants who match 
exculpatory profiles. That equal protection may demand leveling down as well as 
leveling up just follows from the fact that it is a genuinely comparative right.  But rights 
like equal protection can be overridden, and there is reason to think that the case for 
admitting exculpatory profile evidence may be strong enough to override equal 
protection's demand that this evidence be excluded.!
! The case for admitting exculpatory profile evidence might, for example, appeal 
to the right to due protection, which calls for measures that reduce the risk of mistaken 
conviction, so long as they are cost-justified.  Admitting exculpatory profile evidence is a 
measure that would reduce the risk of mistaken conviction for defendants who fit 
exculpatory profiles, and although admitting this evidence would result in mistaken 
acquittals, there is no reason to think it would result in more mistaken acquittals than 
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would other forms of exculpatory evidence that are routinely admitted at trial.    If due 52
protection does demand admitting exculpatory profile evidence, then there would be a 
conflict between the due protection rights of those who fit exculpatory profiles and the 
equal protection rights of those who do not.  Arguably the due protection rights should 
prevail and exculpatory profile evidence ought to be admitted, all-things-considered, 
even though this would be unfair to some defendants.    There could not, by contrast, be 53
a conflict between due protection and equal protection in the case of incriminating 
profile evidence, since no one’s due protection rights could demand that incriminating 
profile evidence be admitted.!!
! We have seen that admitting incriminating profile evidence would create an 
inequality in the distribution of the risks of mistaken conviction, and that admitting 
exculpatory profile evidence would do so as well. But what would be the overall effect 
on the risks of mistaken conviction of admitting both forms of profile evidence? 
Defendants who are accused of a crime may fit some profiles that are incriminating and 
some profiles that are exculpatory.  Conceivably, there could be a defendant for whom 
every incriminating profile that they fit is exactly canceled out by another exculpatory 
profile that they also fit.  But for almost all defendants, taking into account both 
incriminating and exculpatory profile evidence would make a defendant’s guilt, on 
balance, either more probable or less probable than it would be without that evidence.   54
By calibration, then, admitting both forms of profile evidence should increase the risk of 
mistaken conviction for some innocent defendants and decrease it for others, thereby 
creating inequalities in the risks of mistaken conviction across innocent defendants.!!
5 IS PROFILE EVIDENCE UNIQUE?!
Our argument against admitting incriminating profile evidence rests on a simple idea. 
From their ex ante perspective, lawmakers can predict that some defendants, including 
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"  If Enoch and Fisher are right that admitting profile evidence would also compromise deterrence to some 52
extent, then admitting exculpatory profile evidence could be more costly than admitting other forms of 
exculpatory evidence, and it is at least possible that due protection could require admitting other forms of 
exculpatory evidence, but not profile evidence.  
"  If we treat the demands of equality here as contingent on the availability of measures that would not 53
infringe anyone else’s non-comparative rights, as some egalitarians have recommended in other contexts—
see Matthew Clayton, “Equality, Justice and Legitimacy in Selection,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2012): 8–
30—equal protection may not even demand banning exculpatory profile evidence.  Due protection is one 
candidate non-comparative right.  A basic liberty belonging to innocent defendants to mount a defense to 
the best of their ability is another. 
"  Assuming incriminating features tend to cluster together, if someone were to fit one incriminating profile 54
such as Bad Environment, that would make it more likely that they fit other incriminating profiles and less 
likely that they fit exculpatory profiles.
innocent ones, will be incriminated by profile evidence because they fit an incriminating 
profile. The lawmakers can also predict that other defendants will not be incriminated 
by profile evidence because they do not fit an incriminating profile. As a consequence of 
admitting profile evidence, then, those defendants who fit incriminating profiles will be 
exposed to a higher risk of mistaken conviction than other defendants, thus violating 
their rights to equal protection.   !55
! But is profile evidence unique in this respect, or do other kinds of evidence that 
are routinely admitted at trial, such as eyewitness testimony, trace evidence, and motive 
evidence also violate equal protection?  There is a critical difference between profile 
evidence and other kinds of evidence, namely, lawmakers can know in advance of 
particular trials who can and who cannot be incriminated by profile evidence, but they 
cannot know who can and who cannot be incriminated by eyewitness testimony, trace 
evidence or motive evidence. This critical difference will be key to understanding why 
admitting profile evidence at trial would yield unequal risks of mistaken conviction, 
while admitting these other kinds of evidence would not.!!
5.1 We begin with eyewitness testimony evidence, which is probative of a defendant’s 
guilt when the defendant fits the physical description of the perpetrator that has been 
provided by an eyewitness.  This is a fallible form of evidence, in the sense that an 
innocent defendant could be mistakenly incriminated by it. But there is no way for 
lawmakers to know in advance of particular trials what, if any, physical descriptions of 
the culprit would be given by eyewitnesses.  Since any physical description could be 
incriminating if it is provided by an eyewitness to the crime the defendant is accused of, 
there is no innocent defendant who is immune to mistaken incrimination by this form of 
evidence.!
! The same can be said of trace evidence. When physical traces are found at a 
crime scene, they will be analyzed for certain characteristics that are statistically 
uncommon, such as genetic profiles or fingerprint patterns. If the defendant matches the 
traces — that is, if the defendant and the traces share the relevant characteristic — the 
match will be incriminating. Trace evidence, like eyewitness testimony, is fallible. An  
analyst might have made a mistake, or the perpetrator and an innocent defendant might 
coincidentally share the same characteristic. But again, as with eyewitness testimony, 
there is no type of defendant who is immune to being mistakenly incriminated by trace 
evidence. For example, anyone with DNA could be incriminated by DNA evidence—it 
all depends on whether their DNA matches the DNA of a sample found at a crime scene.!
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"  Admitting exculpatory profile evidence will infringe the equal protection rights of defendants who do not 55
fit exculpatory profiles, but since their rights are more likely to be overridden, we focus here on profile 
evidence in its incriminating form.  
! So we see that both eyewitness testimony and trace evidence differ from profile 
evidence because, from the ex ante perspective of lawmakers, any type of innocent 
defendant can be mistakenly incriminated by them. This is important since our 
argument in Section 4 against admitting profile evidence relied on the premise that this 
evidence cannot mistakenly incriminate any type of defendant but can only incriminate 
defendants who fit incriminating profiles.  Since the same premise is not true of 
eyewitness testimony and trace evidence, the same argument cannot be used to show 
that admitting these forms of evidence would violate equal protection.!
! ! !
5.2 The fact that profile evidence can only incriminate some types of defendants  
distinguishes it from a variety of kinds of evidence, even those that would seem to 
resemble profile evidence quite closely.    Consider motive evidence, such as “the 56
defendant recently fought with the murder victim” or “the defendant stood to gain 
financially from the death of the victim.”  Both motive and profile evidence exploit 
generalizations about what people who are similar to the defendant in some respect are 
more likely to do. Just as profile evidence can incriminate only defendants who fit 
profiles correlated with the types of crime they are accused of, motive evidence can 
incriminate only defendants who fit descriptions like “fought with the victim” or “stood 
to gain financially from the death of the victim.”  The resemblance between profile 
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Suppose camera footage shows that, on a particular day and time, one thousand people gathered in a 
stadium, but the ticket sales indicate that only fifty tickets were purchased. This means that 95 percent of the 
people in the stadium that day entered illegally by crashing the gates.  Although we cannot tell who 
gatecrashed and who did not, it is very likely that any spectator picked at random did gatecrash. Our 
argument in Section 4 that admitting profile evidence would violate equal protection does not apply to 
Gatecrasher-like evidence because this kind of evidence can incriminate any defendant. From the ex ante 
point of view of lawmakers, there is no defendant who could not be incriminated by this evidence since 
anyone could find themselves at some event or other where a significant proportion of the attendees 
committed a certain crime.  Those who regard profile evidence and Gatecrasher-like evidence as entirely on 
a par might insist on a unified account of their inadmissibility, which we have not provided.  Still, the well-
established intuition in the literature is only that Gatecrasher-like evidence is insufficient for a guilty verdict, 
not that it should be inadmissible. For early work on this puzzle, see, e.g., L.J. Cohen, The Probable and the 
Provable (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); Charles R. Nesson, “Reasonable Doubt and Permissive 
Inferences: The Value of Complexity,” Harvard Law Review 92 (1979): 1187–1225; Judith Jarvis Thomson, 
“Liability and Individualized Evidence,” Law and Contemporary Problems 49 (1986): 199–219. For more recent 
work, see, e.g., Sarah Moss, Probabilistic Knowledge; Martin Smith, “When Does Evidence Suffice for 
Conviction?,” Mind 127 (2018): 1193–1218; and Clayton Littlejohn, “Truth, Knowledge, and the Standard of 
Proof in Criminal Law,” Synthese (forthcoming).  For a risk-based argument against convictions that rest on 
gatecrasher-like evidence, see Marcello Di Bello, “Trial by Statistics: Is a High Probability of Guilt Enough to 
Convict?” Mind (forthcoming). 
evidence and motive evidence is so close that scholars have struggled to find reasons for 
why the two kinds of evidence should be treated differently at trial.  !57
! Despite the close resemblance between profile evidence and motive evidence, we 
should not overlook a crucial difference between them which can be brought into clear 
focus by taking into account the ex ante perspective of lawmakers.  Lawmakers can 
know, in advance of particular crimes, who would fit and who would not fit an 
incriminating profile. Defendants who do not fit any profile that is correlated with the 
type of crime they are accused of will be immune to mistaken incrimination by profile 
evidence. But lawmakers cannot know, in advance of particular crimes with particular 
victims, who would fall under such descriptions as “fought with the victim” or “stood to 
gain financially from the death of the victim.”  Whether someone falls under some such 
description for a crime they are accused of will depend on the circumstances of that 
particular crime, and because the circumstances of particular crimes will vary, any 
innocent person could find themselves falling under some such description. To illustrate, 
any innocent person could have a motive to murder someone or other.  If any of those 
people were ever murdered, this innocent person would then fall under some 
description like “stood to gain from the death of the victim” of that murder, and could 
be mistakenly incriminated by motive evidence.  Thus, from the ex ante point of view of 
lawmakers, there is no one who is immune to mistaken incrimination by motive 
evidence.   !58
! The difference between profile evidence and other forms of evidence — namely, 
that profile evidence can only mistakenly incriminate some types of defendants and not 
others, while eyewitness, trace and motive evidence can incriminate any type of 
defendant — is not attributable to the fact that profile evidence is statistical while other 
kinds of evidence are not.  Profile evidence is a form of statistical evidence, but 
eyewitness, trace, and motive evidence can also be presented together with statistical 
generalizations about, say, the typical error rates of eyewitnesses under certain 
conditions, the frequency of genetic profiles, or the likelihood that someone who fought  
with another person would later kill them.  While the availability of such statistics at 
trial can help the fact-finders assess probative value correctly, it does not change the fact 
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"  Michael Redmayne in Character in the Criminal Trial (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) is skeptical 57
that there is any reason to exclude character evidence like Prior Burglary that would not also be a reason to 
exclude motive evidence. Our account does identify such a reason since admitting bad character evidence 
like Prior Burglary would violate equal protection, but admitting bad motive evidence does not.
"  To be sure, lawmakers cannot know who would end up committing burglary either. If they were to 58
consider people at birth, they could not predict where people would end up in their adult lives. But the ex 
ante perspective of lawmakers is located in advance of particular trials, not behind a veil of ignorance. Before 
any particular trial for burglary, lawmakers can know who committed burglary before, but they can have no 
knowledge of the circumstances of particular crimes.
that eyewitness, trace, and motive evidence can mistakenly incriminate any type of 
innocent defendant, since the statistics in question do not constrain who can be 
incriminated by these forms of evidence.  !59!
! ! !
6 RISKS OF INCRIMINATION VERSUS RISKS OF CONVICTION!
We’ve explained how eyewitness testimony, trace evidence, and motive evidence could 
mistakenly incriminate any defendant, unlike profile evidence.  This key difference 
means that the argument in Section 4, which showed why admitting profile evidence 
would threaten equal protection, is inapplicable to these other kinds of evidence. But 
even if that argument does not apply to them, there might be other grounds for thinking 
that their admissibility at trial would pose a threat to equal protection.  Even though any 
innocent defendant can be mistakenly incriminated by these other kinds of evidence, 
what if some defendants are more likely to be mistakenly incriminated by them than 
others?  We will argue that, although admitting eyewitness testimony and other kinds of 
evidence might well give rise to different risks of mistaken incrimination, this should not 
give rise to different risks of mistaken conviction if the probative value of the evidence is 
assessed correctly.!!
6.1  At first glance, there is no reason to think that there are any types of innocent 
defendants who would be more likely than others to be misidentified by an eyewitness, 
to misleadingly match a DNA sample found at a crime scene, or to have had a motive to 
commit a crime they have been falsely accused of.  And if no types of innocent 
defendants are more likely to be mistakenly incriminated than any others by these kinds 
of evidence, then admitting them should not expose any defendants to a higher risk of 
mistaken conviction and thus would not threaten any defendants’ rights to equal 
protection.  !
! On closer examination, however, lawmakers could have reason to believe that 
some types of defendants would be more vulnerable to mistaken incrimination by these 
kinds of evidence than others. Lawmakers might, for example, have good reason to 
believe that some innocent defendants would be at a predictably higher risk of mistaken 
incrimination by eyewitness testimony compared to others.  For one thing, eyewitnesses 
may be worse at identifying some types of defendants than others. Cross-racial 
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defendants with genetic profiles that are statistically more common could not be as strongly incriminated by 
DNA trace evidence as defendants with less common genetic profiles. Similarly, statistics about the 
reliability of eyewitnesses identifications could make it the case that defendants with a more common  
appearance could not be as strongly incriminated as others. For a discussion of this point in terms of 
probative value, see Section 6.
identifications are known to be less reliable than intra-racial ones.   If eyewitnesses on 60
average are less reliable at identifying black defendants than they are at identifying 
white defendants, then innocent black defendants could be more likely to be mistakenly 
incriminated by eyewitness testimony than innocent white defendants.    And even 61
when reliability is the same, there may be other reasons why some innocent defendants 
are at a higher risk of mistaken incrimination by eyewitness testimony than others. For 
example, since people who live in high crime areas will be seen near a crime scene more 
often, the risk that they would be misidentified as perpetrators would be higher 
compared to innocent people living in low crime areas even assuming that eyewitnesses 
are no more reliable at identifying people in low crime areas than in high crime areas.  !
! It is tempting to conclude that these differences in the risk of incrimination 
automatically translate into differences in the risk of conviction. If, from the ex ante point 
of view, the bodies of evidence against one type of innocent defendant are more likely to 
contain a piece of incriminating eyewitness testimony than the bodies of evidence 
against other innocent defendants, and all else is equal, wouldn’t it follow that the first 
type of defendant would be exposed to a higher risk of mistaken conviction?  If this is 
correct, then some types of defendants will be more likely to be mistakenly convicted by 
eyewitness testimony than others, and their rights to equal protection would be 
infringed.!!
6.2 While this piece of reasoning sounds appealing, it contains a subtle mistake.  
Different risks of mistaken incrimination by eyewitness testimony need not, and should 
not, result in different risks of mistaken conviction. The first thing to note here is that 
eyewitness testimony, like any kind of evidence, should be assigned the right probative 
value. In order to assign evidence the right probative value, we must assess the risk that 
it would mistakenly incriminate an innocent defendant.  The higher the risk of mistaken 
incrimination by the evidence, the lower the probative value of the evidence. After all, 
the more prone to error the evidence, the weaker the evidence. This is how evidence 
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white eyewitness than by a black eyewitness.  See C. A. Meissner and J. C. Brigham, “Thirty Years of 
Investigating the Own-race Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-analytic Review,” Psychology, Public Policy, and 
Law 7 (2001): 3–35. 
"  If we assume that a black defendant is more likely to be incriminated by a white eyewitness than a white 61
defendant by a black eyewitness, the 56% difference (see previous footnote) would expose innocent black 
defendants to a higher risk of misidentification than innocent white defendants. 
should be rationally weighed.   Consequently, if people living in high crime areas are at 62
higher risk of being mistakenly incriminated by eyewitness testimony, then eyewitness 
testimony against them should be assigned a lower probative value than eyewitness 
testimony against those who live in low crime areas.  The same applies to testimonies 
against black versus white defendants.!
! The second thing to note is that, if fact-finders are rational, their readiness to 
convict on a body of evidence depends on the overall probative value of that body. This 
is the rational calibration principle we introduced in Section 4. If an eyewitness 
testimony against a defendant in a high crime area should be judged as less probative 
than a similar testimony against a defendant in a low crime area, adding the former 
testimony to the overall body of evidence should increase its probative value — and, by 
calibration, the risk of conviction — by less than the latter testimony. The same can be 
said of testimonies against black defendants as opposed to testimonies against white 
defendants.!
! So even though some defendants are at a predictably higher risk of mistaken 
incrimination by eyewitness evidence, this higher risk is offset by the fact that 
eyewitness evidence against them should be assigned a lower probative value. This 
lower probative value, by calibration, should lead to a smaller increase in the risk of 
conviction when eyewitness evidence is presented against innocent defendants whose 
risk of incrimination is higher.  Thus, if fact-finders are rationally calibrated to the bodies 
of evidence against defendants, admitting eyewitness testimony would not subject 
innocent defendants who are at higher risk of mistaken incrimination to a higher risk of 
mistaken conviction.  !
! This point generalizes to any form of evidence that exposes some defendants to a 
higher risk of mistaken incrimination than others, so long as the evidence is capable of 
mistakenly incriminating any type of defendant.  For example, although the diagnostic 
power of DNA testing should be the same regardless of the individual being tested, 
different laboratories might follow different standards, and this might result in 
predictably different risks of false positive matches for different defendants. But if the 
match is the result of a laboratory analysis with a higher error rate, it should be assigned 
a lower probative value compared to a match resulting from a laboratory analysis with a 
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the defendant’s guilt G and innocence I — is measured by the likelihood ratio Pr(E/G)/Pr(E/I). The higher 
Pr(E/G)/Pr(E/I) (for values above one), the more probative of guilt the evidence. This also means that the 
higher Pr(E/I) — which tracks the risk of mistaken incrimination by evidence E— the lower the likelihood 
ratio and thus the lower the probative value of evidence E. See, e.g., Philip Dawid, “Bayes’s Theorem and 
Weighing Evidence by Juries,” in Bayes’s Theorem, ed. Richard Swinburne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 71–90, and Marcello Di Bello and Bart Verheij, “Evidential Reasoning,“ in Handbook of Legal Reasoning 
and Argumentation, eds. Giorgio Bongiovanni, Gerald J. Postema, Antonino Rotolo, Giovanni Sartor, Chiara 
Valentini, and Douglas Walton (Dordrecht: Springer, 2018), 447–493.
lower error rate.   Whenever some defendants — for whatever reason — are at higher 63
risk of mistaken incrimination by DNA evidence, this higher risk should be offset by 
assigning it a lower probative value.  !64!
6.3  Let’s take stock. We first argued that any type of innocent defendant can be 
mistakenly incriminated by forms of evidence such as eyewitness testimony, trace 
evidence, and motive evidence. But it does not follow from this that no type of 
defendant could be at higher risk of being mistakenly incriminated by these other forms 
of evidence, and in fact, some types of defendants may well be more likely to be 
mistakenly incriminated by them. Nevertheless, we showed that different risks of 
mistaken incrimination by these forms of evidence will not lead to different risks of 
mistaken conviction if the fact-finders assess their probative value correctly.  !
! In order to adjust their assessment of the probative value of the evidence and 
prevent inequalities in the risks of mistaken conviction from arising, fact-finders will 
need to be informed about the risk of mistaken incrimination by that evidence. Equal 
protection, then, requires admitting various statistical generalizations at trial: error rates 
of laboratories that do DNA testing, statistics about the reliability of eyewitnesses in 
different circumstances, and so on. If the fact-finders are not given this information (and  
they often are not), admitting eyewitness testimony and other forms of evidence could 
violate equal protection. But there are already reasons of accuracy to give them this 
information.   In a well-functioning courtroom, then, admitting these forms of evidence 65
would not violate equal protection.!
! This prompts a question.  If a correct assessment of the probative value of 
eyewitness and trace evidence would prevent unequal risks of mistaken incrimination 
from yielding unequal risks of mistaken conviction, why wouldn’t a correct assessment 
of the probative value of profile evidence do the same? Recall the key difference between 
these other forms of evidence and profile evidence: namely, eyewitness and trace 
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"  Forensic scientists have recommended that laboratory error rates be taken into account while assessing 63
the probative value of a DNA match; see, e.g., Forensic DNA Evidence Interpretation (2nd edition), ed. John S. 
Buckleton, Jo-Anne Bright and Duncan Taylor (Boca Raton, FL: CRP Press, 2016).
"  The frequency of genetic profiles also affects the risk of false positive DNA matches.  The higher the 64
frequency of the profile, the higher the risk of a false positive match. This differences in the risk of false 
positives can be offset by the right assessment of probative value. The forensic literature is clear that the 
probative value of DNA matches should reflect differences in the frequencies of profiles; see earlier footnote.
"  Although there is typically no legal requirement that the fact-finders be informed about eyewitness 65
reliability — see e.g. Laura Connelly, “Cross-Racial Identifications: Solutions to the ‘They All Look Alike’ 
Effect,” Michigan Journal of Race and Law 21 (2015):125–145 — the Supreme Court of New Jersey has required 
jury instructions to inform jurors about sources of unreliability of eyewitness evidence; see State v. 
Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (NJ 2011).
evidence can incriminate any defendant, while profile evidence can only incriminate 
defendants who fit incriminating profiles correlated with the type of crime they are 
accused of.  If the fact-finders were to assess the probative value of, say, Prior Burglary, 
they should not regard this evidence as probative of the guilt of defendants who have 
not committed prior burglaries. They should, however, regard it as probative of the guilt 
of defendants who have committed prior burglaries—the stronger the correlation, the 
more probative the evidence.!
! Thus, if the probative value of profile evidence is assessed correctly, this evidence 
should be regarded as probative of guilt when it is presented against defendants who fit 
incriminating profiles, and should not be regarded as probative of guilt when it is 
presented against defendants who do not fit such profiles. Admitting this evidence at 
trial would therefore, by calibration, increase the risks of mistaken conviction for those 
who fit profiles but not for those who do not.  The only assessments of its probative 
value that could preserve equal risks of mistaken conviction would be either to assign 
profile evidence no probative value against defendants who fit profiles or to assign it the 
same probative value against defendants who do not fit profiles as against defendants 
who do.  But neither assessment is correct.!
 !!
7 CONCLUSION!
We set out to vindicate the intuition that admitting profile evidence at trial wrongs 
defendants.  We showed why admitting profile evidence at trial would expose some 
defendants to a higher risk of mistaken conviction than others, infringing their rights to 
equal protection.  Our account can also explain why admitting other forms of evidence, 
such as eyewitness testimony, trace evidence, and motive evidence would not be 
inconsistent with equal protection.  Although admitting other forms of evidence can 
expose some defendants to a higher risk of mistaken incrimination than others, it will 
not expose them to higher risks of mistaken conviction, so long as the fact-finders 
properly assess the probative value of the evidence.  But it is precisely when fact-finders 
assess the probative value of profile evidence correctly that admitting it would violate 
some defendants’ equal protection rights.  The fault lies with profile evidence, not with 
the fact-finders.  !
! Our argument has been restricted to the question of the admissibility of profile 
evidence during the guilt phase of criminal trials.  This is not the only criminal justice 
context in which profile evidence may be used.  In closing, we will briefly compare our 
fairness-based objection to the use of profile evidence at trial with a similar objection to 
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the use of profile evidence in policing.    Just as we showed that admitting profile 66
evidence at trial would expose some innocent defendants to a higher risk of mistaken 
conviction, a similar line of argument could be used to show that permitting profiling in 
policing would expose innocent citizens belonging to the profiled groups to a higher risk 
of mistaken stops and searches.  Would these higher risks of mistaken stops and searches 
be unfair to those innocent citizens?    ! !67
! The fact that policing is a criminal justice context, governed by equality before 
the law, lends plausibility to the view that being exposed to a higher risk of mistaken 
stops and searches is unfair. On the other hand, some have argued that it would not be 
unreasonable to expect innocent citizens to accept a higher risk of such a burden when 
this would promote an important public good like security, provided that society 
displayed reciprocity along other dimensions.    And even if it would be unfair to 68
impose higher (and uncompensated) risks of mistaken stops and searches on some 
innocent citizens for the sake of the public good of security, some have argued that it 
would not be unfair if the same group of innocent citizens who were exposed to a higher 
risk of stops by the practice of profiling also gained more security than others, so that 
they were net beneficiaries of the practice. This might be the case if the main victims of 
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Katerina Hadjimatheou, “Racial Profiling,” in The SAGE Encyclopedia of Surveillance, Security, and Privacy 
(Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2018).  
"  There appears to be some support for the view that they would be. Some scholars have argued that even 67
an idealized form of racial profiling (i.e., rational and respectful) would be unfair, because it would 
disproportionately burden innocent members of the profiled race.  For versions of this objection, see Randall 
Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), 159–61, and Naomi Zack, White Privilege 
and Black Rights: The Injustice of U.S. Police Racial Profiling and Homicide (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 
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higher risks of mistaken stops and searches in virtue of fitting a certain profile.  See Steven Durlauf, 
“Assessing Racial Profiling,” The Economic Journal 116 (2001): 402–426. 
"  See Mathias Risse and Richard Zeckhauser, “Racial Profiling,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 32 (2004): 131–70, 68
156–8; and David Boonin, Should Race Matter? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 341–7.  See 
also Deborah Hellman, “Racial Profiling and the Meaning of Racial Categories,” in Contemporary Debates in 
Applied Ethics, 235–6, although she still objects to racial profiling on the grounds of the demeaning message 
that it sends.
guilty citizens belonging to the profiled group were other innocent citizens belonging to 
the same group.   !69
! Whether or not these considerations successfully defuse the charge of unfairness 
against the use of profile evidence in policing, we have shown that similar 
considerations would not defuse the charge of unfairness against the use of profile 
evidence at the trial stage.  If our argument in Section 3 is correct, innocent defendants 
would still have a complaint against procedures that exposed them to a higher risk of 
mistaken conviction, even if these higher risks permitted a more efficient reduction in 
crime. There is also an important difference between citizens who are affected by higher 
risks of mistaken stops and searches, and defendants who are affected by higher risks of 
mistaken convictions.  Perhaps higher risks of mistaken stops and searches could be 
justified to innocent citizens belonging to the profiled groups, since it may be in their 
overall interests as citizens to accept a higher risk of mistaken stops in exchange for a 
lower risk of victimization.  But even if a higher risk of mistaken conviction would be in 
their overall interests as innocent citizens, because the main victims of guilty members of 
a profiled group were, say, other innocent members of the same profiled group, it would 
not be in their overall interests as innocent defendants, and it is to defendants that 
unequal risks of mistaken conviction must be justified. 70
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"  On this, see the argument in 3.3.70
